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SPECIAL FEATURE
TRIBAL COURTS, NON-INDIANS, AND THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JURY AFTER THE 2013 REAUTHORIZATION
OF VAWA*
Cynthia Castillo**
Introduction
In February 2013, Congress passed the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA).1 The previous version of the bill
lapsed in 2011 while lawmakers argued over several controversial
provisions. One particularly controversial provision of the Act now extends
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians2 in cases involving couples living
on a reservation when one partner is Indian and the other partner is not. 3
This provision leads some to fear that non-Indians subjected to tribal court
jurisdiction will face biased juries.
Juries are fundamental to our system of justice, and whether the public
views tribal court proceedings over non-Indians as fair will depend on the
composition of tribal court juries. The fears about tribal court jurisdiction
under the VAWA highlight how the racial composition of a jury can affect
the perceived fairness of a trial. While concerns are valid, because the
VAWA requires tribes to draw their jurors from sources that mirror a fair
cross-section of the community,4 in most cases the non-Indians subject to
tribal court jurisdiction will have access to juries composed of Indians and
non-Indians. Thus, these juries will likely meet the constitutional test for

* First-place winner, 2013–14 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
** Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso, Tex. J.D.,
2014, University of Virginia School of Law; M.S., 2009, University of Pennsylvania; B.A.,
2007, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Ashley Parker, House Renews Violence Against Women Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/politics/congress-passes-reauthorization-ofviolence-against-women-act.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2. A note on terminology: I will use the terms “Indian” and “non-Indian” in this paper
rather than “Native American” and “American” as those are the terms used in the relevant
statutes, Supreme Court cases, and scholarship.
3. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122.
4. Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(3)(A), 127 Stat. at 122.
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determining whether a jury is impartial that the Supreme Court set forth in
Duren v. Missouri.
Many of the fears about subjecting non-Indians to an unfamiliar judicial
system with different norms and potential cultural and language barriers are
equally applicable when Indians are tried in federal courts; yet Indians who
have argued that they were subject to partial juries in federal courts have
not prevailed under the Duren test.5 It may be that many of the systems the
Duren test has upheld, while constitutionally fair, would not meet other
standards of fairness. While tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians may
be fair under our current constitutional standard, there may be other fairness
concerns that cause us to evaluate how protective our current constitutional
standard actually is.
The VAWA’s grant of tribal court jurisdiction is needed, but it presents
(at least) two challenges. First, the VAWA further complicates an already
complex jurisdictional scheme by granting jurisdiction to tribal courts in a
narrow class of cases, while leaving the remaining cases under federal (and
sometimes state) jurisdiction. Second, the VAWA presents complex
constitutional and federal common law issues. Whether the VAWA can
provide the right to an impartial jury is only one of the many legal questions
the Act’s tribal court jurisdiction provision raises.
Part I of this note provides a background for the discussion by
describing the relevant provisions of the VAWA, providing necessary
background and summarizing Supreme Court precedent regarding tribal
court jurisdiction. Part II reviews the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury, the fair cross-section requirement and examines the fair cross-section
challenges brought by Indians in federal court to determine the scope of this
requirement. Part III analyzes whether non-Indians will receive impartial
juries. Finally, Part IV looks at how the racial composition of juries can
affect the perceived fairness of trials.
I. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
On February 28, 2013, the Republican-led House of Representatives
passed the VAWA after a long, partisan debate.6 The bill had already
passed the Senate, but Republican concerns about the VAWA’s provisions
expanding tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians and extending
protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender victims and

5. See infra Part II.B.
6. Parker, supra note 1.
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undocumented immigrants jeopardized its passage in the House.7 The
House Republican’s own version of the bill, which ultimately failed to gain
enough support, had deleted those controversial provisions.8
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians has been a subject of much
debate since the Supreme Court ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe that tribal courts could not exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians
under existing law.9 That decision left the federal government with the
responsibility of prosecuting non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian
country. According to those who advocated for the passage of the VAWA,
however, the federal government had been lax in exercising its jurisdiction
and prosecuting non-Indian offenders, especially in rape and domestic
violence cases.10 To those advocates, the VAWA is a step in the right
direction because it gives Indian women the protection and justice they
deserve, and it gives tribes more control over their territories.11 Critics of
the provision, however, fear that non-Indians subject to tribal court
jurisdiction may face uncertainty, bias, and violations of their constitutional
rights.12
A. Violence Against Indian Women: The Problem and Solution
Prosecuting sexual violence in Indian Country has proven difficult. For
one thing, determining which government has criminal jurisdiction in
“Indian country”13 is complicated. Some scholars have described Indian
7. Tom Cohen, House Passes Violence Against Women Act After GOP Version Defeated,
CNN (Feb. 28, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/politics/violence-againstwomen/.
8. Id.
9. 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see infra Part II.B.
10. Louise Erdrich, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A25 (stating
that “prosecutors decline to prosecute 67 percent of sexual abuse cases” and that more than
80% of sex crimes committed on reservations are committed by non-Indians).
11. See, e.g., NCAI Praises Passage of Protections for All Women; Tribal Courts Gain
Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Domestic Violence Perpetrators, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM.
INDIANS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2013/02/28/house-passes-violenceagainst-women-act.
12. See, e.g., Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be
Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC.
GROUPS, July 2012, at 40.
13. Indian country is a term of art that is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
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country as a “jurisdictional maze.”14 The federal government exercises
criminal jurisdiction for all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian
country.15 When the perpetrator is Indian, the federal government exercises
criminal jurisdiction for “major crimes,” while tribal courts exercise
jurisdiction for “minor crimes.”16 A few states have jurisdiction over some
crimes committed in Indian Country, but they rarely exercise this
jurisdiction.17 The VAWA creates an exception to the rule that tribal courts
cannot exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.18 Under the VAWA, tribal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians in “special domestic
violence” cases.19
Before discussing the text of the VAWA, it is important to understand
why such a provision is necessary and why it is limited to “special domestic
violence” cases. One might wonder why tribal courts need jurisdiction over
non-Indians if federal prosecutors, and in some cases state prosecutors,
already have the ability to prosecute these crimes. The answer is that crimes
of sexual violence are under-enforced for a number of reasons. Sexual
violence crimes are generally harder to prosecute than other crimes because
physical evidence is often unavailable. Because rape and domestic violence
crimes typically fall under state jurisdiction, federal prosecutors may lack
experience prosecuting these types of crimes. Federal prosecutors also have

original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the Jurisdictional
Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES
1 (2009).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
16. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C § 1153 (2012). The statute classifies “murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, . . . felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, [and] robbery”
as major crimes. Id.
17. The text of the Major Crimes Act gives states authority over the crimes not
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), see id., but such jurisdiction is rarely
exercised. For a discussion of why states may choose to not exercise jurisdiction in Indian
country, see Pacheco, supra note 14, at 23–29. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (giving certain
states jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country).
18. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122.
19. Id.
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limited resources, which makes travel to remote reservations impractical.20
Moreover, there is often a cultural barrier between the federal prosecutor
and the Indian community.21 This barrier may make victims and witnesses
more reluctant to confide in federal prosecutors.22 There may also be a
language barrier making communication with the federal prosecutor more
difficult.23 Prosecutors may also consider domestic violence crimes to be
minor compared to the other crimes that fall under their jurisdiction.
Finally, the complex jurisdictional structure may cause confusion between
law enforcement agencies over who has jurisdiction, since jurisdiction
depends on the race or tribal membership of the defendant and the severity
of the crime.
Whatever the reasons may be for the under-enforcement of these crimes,
sexual violence crimes are rampant in Indian country. According to the
Department of Justice, Indian women are more than twice as likely to
experience rape or sexual assault than women of other races.24 Non-Indian
men commit anywhere from 60% to 80% of sexual assaults on Indian
women.25 These statistics are not particularly surprising considering that
non-Indians make up 77% of the residents in Indian country.26 Since nonIndians cannot be prosecuted by tribes, and are often not prosecuted by
federal and state courts, sexual violence crimes are grossly underprosecuted in Indian country.27 This startling reality of the dangers Indian

20. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 729 (2006).
21. See id. at 710–11.
22. See id. at 729.
23. Id.
24. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 23 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf (“A recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that
the rate of violent victimization for Native Americans was more than twice the rate for the
Nation (124 versus 50 per 1,000 persons age 12 and older).”).
25. See Laura E. Pisarello, Comment, Lawless by Design: Jurisdiction, Gender and
Justice in Indian Country, 59 EMORY L.J. 1515, 1517 (2010) (citing statistics showing that 4
out of 5 assaults are committed by non-Indian males and that over 70% of assaults are
committed by non-Indian males); Erdrich, supra note 10 (stating that more than 80% of
assaults are committed by non-Indians).
26. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 14 (2012).
27. Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian
Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1278 (2004).
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women face led Congress to consider expanding tribal court jurisdiction for
these types of cases.28
Despite the enormity of the problem, the jurisdiction provided by the
VAWA is fairly narrow. Congress has provided concurrent federal and
tribal jurisdiction over all persons only for “special domestic violence”
cases.29 Jurisdiction is not authorized if both the victim and the defendant
are non-Indian or if the defendant lacks ties to a participating Indian tribe.30
A defendant has ties to a tribe if he:
(i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe;
(ii) is employed in the Indian country of the participating
tribe; or
(iii) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of—
(I) a member of the participating tribe; or
(II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the
participating tribe.31
This language substantially narrows the non-Indian population subject to
tribal prosecution to those with substantial relationships to Indians or Indian
country. It excludes non-Indians who commit acts of sexual assault within
Indian country, but who do not live or work in Indian country and are not in
any type of romantic relationship with their victims.32 The limited nature of
the bill ensures that those who fall under tribal jurisdiction will be at least
somewhat familiar with the prosecuting tribe and its customs.

28. Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (“[W]e heard that domestic
violence and sexual assault against Native women is still an epidemic . . . . In response, I
introduced . . . [the] SAVE Native Women Act.”).
29. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added). The statute is gender neutral, but I will use the male pronoun
throughout this note as the statistics show that there is a high rate of non-Indian males
sexually ssaulting Indian females.
32. This definition would exclude one potential type of defendant—the one specifically
highlighted by Erdrich. She states that the number of sexual assaults that take place in Indian
country increases during hunting season. See Erdrich, supra note 10. Presumably these
hunters do not have the required ties to Indian country that would bring them under tribal
court jurisdiction.
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The VAWA also narrowly defines the type of conduct that subjects
defendants to tribal jurisdiction.33 A tribe may only exercise jurisdiction if a
defendant commits an act of “domestic violence or dating violence,” or if
the defendant violates a protective order enforceable by the tribe while in
Indian country.34 As defined by the statute, dating violence is “violence
committed by a person who is or has been in a social relationship of a
romantic or intimate nature with the victim . . . .”35 Domestic violence is
violence committed by the “current or former spouse or intimate partner of
the victim, by a person who the victim” (1) shares a child with, (2)
cohabitates with (or has previously cohabited with), or (3) “by a person
similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic- or familyviolence laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian country
where the violence occurs.”36 The definitions of domestic and dating
violence imply that, in most cases, there must be an existing relationship
between the victim and the defendant, even though the Act states that a
relationship is only one of three ways to come under tribal jurisdiction. It
appears that the only situation where the statute does not require a preexisting intimate or romantic relationship is where the victim has received a
protective order against someone who works or lives within Indian country.
The statute also affords defendants all applicable rights provided under
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which provides most, but not all, of the
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.37 There are a few key Constitutional
protections missing from the ICRA, however, including the right to an
impartial jury and the right to a grand jury.38 In recognition of this shortfall,
the VAWA requires “the right to a trial by an impartial jury.”39 This jury
must be drawn from sources that “reflect a fair cross section of the
community” and “do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the
community, including non-Indians.”40 Tribal courts must also provide
defendants with “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and
33. Id.
34. Id. § 204(c)(1)
35. Id. § 204(a)(1)
36. Id. § 204(a)(2)
37. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (titled “Constitutional Rights”); see also Carla
Christofferson, Note, Trial Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American Women: A
Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169 n.5 (1991).
38. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
39. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(d)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 122.
40. Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(3)(A), 127 Stat. at 122.
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affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”41 At the very
least, these provisions try to address the concerns of critics by disallowing
jurisdiction if non-Indians are barred from serving on juries.
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction: The History and the Controversy
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians has been a controversial issue
since long before the debate over the VAWA. In Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, decided in 1978, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts do
not have jurisdiction to try non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian
Country “absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”42 The
Court stated that the sovereignty of Indian tribes is diminished, and that
tribes hold the territory that they do “with the assent of the United States,
and under its authority.”43 Moreover, the Court also stated that: “[b]y
submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian
tribes . . . necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”44 The basic
theme of the Court’s reasoning, therefore, is that Indian tribes operate under
the authority of the federal government and they have only the power that
Congress grants them.
To support its holding, the Oliphant Court emphasized the cultural and
racial differences between Indians and non-Indians.45 It cited to Ex parte
Crow Dog, an 1883 Supreme Court decision that addressed whether federal
courts had jurisdiction over Indians who committed crimes against other
Indians, and held that they did not.46 In so holding, the Ex parte Crow Dog
Court noted that by subjecting non-Indians who committed crimes against
other non-Indians to federal law, the United States was not trying Indians
“by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their
land” but rather by a different race. The Oliphant Court found this language
persuasive and stated that this reasoning applies equally in the situation of
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians as it does to federal jurisdiction
over Indians.47 By re-affirming this language from Ex parte Crow Dog, the
41. Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(4), 127 Stat. at 122.
42. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
43. Id. at 209 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 571 (1846)).
44. Id. at 210.
45. Id. at 210–11 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).
46. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). This case came before passage of the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), which gave federal courts this jurisdiction.
47. Id.
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Court seems to be saying that Indians and their laws and customs are so
different from non-Indian, American laws and customs, that any trial in
which one group asserts their law over the other would be unfair. Thus, the
Oliphant Court (if not our current Supreme Court) would appear to agree
with the critics of the VAWA who are concerned about how fair a tribal
court exercising jurisdiction over a non-Indian can really be.
Most criticism of the VAWA’s jurisdictional provision, and tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians in general, has centered over whether tribal
court juries can be impartial.48 In reaction to the VAWA’s tribal court
provision, Senator Chuck Grassley stated, “[y]ou’ve got to have a jury that
is reflective of society as a whole, and on an Indian reservation, it’s going
to be made up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn’t get a fair trial.”49
This issue was also a key factor in Oliphant as the Court noted with concern
that non-Indians were not allowed on juries by Suquamish Tribe.50
Although Congress tried to allay the fears expressed by both the
Oliphant Court and Senator Grassley by including a requirement of an
impartial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community, there is
still fear about how tribal court juries will treat non-Indian defendants,
especially when the non-Indian is charged with violence against an Indian
woman. In a heated exchange with an Indian advocacy group for sexual
assault survivors, U.S. Congressman Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), who voted
for the VAWA, stated that he thought due process concerns would
ultimately lead the Supreme Court to overturn the Act.51 According to the
account of an activist, Congressman Cramer also stated that as a nonIndian, he now fears walking onto a reservation.52 It is notable that these
concerns are similar to those that long have been expressed by other
minority groups tried in state and federal courts.
II. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement
Juries are a fundamental element of our system of criminal adjudication,
so it is no wonder that critics of the VAWA focus their concerns on tribal
court juries. As the Supreme Court stated in Glasser v. United States, “the
48. See, for example, Senator Grassley’s comment regarding the jurisdictional
provisions in Erdrich, supra note 10.
49. Erdrich, supra note 10.
50. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
51. Luke Johnson, Kevin Cramer, North Dakota Congressman, Regrets Berating Native
American Counselors, HUFFINGTON POST (updated Mar. 29, 2013, 10:23 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28/kevin-cramer-north-dakota-native- american_n_2974676.html.
52. Id.
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notion of what a proper jury is has become inextricably intertwined with the
idea of jury trial.”53 The right to a jury trial is a “fundamental right” that
protects criminal defendants from government oppression.54 The
Constitution does not stop there; the Sixth Amendment requires a trial “by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”55 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to require
that juries be “‘truly representative of the community,’ and not the organ of
any special group or class.”56 Thus, the Constitution is not satisfied with
just any jury. Rather, the people who comprise the jury determine whether a
given jury is impartial.
Congress codified this requirement, also known as the fair cross-section
requirement, into federal law in the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968 (JSSA).57 The JSSA states in part: “It is the policy of the United
States that all litigants in Federal Courts entitled to trial by jury shall have
the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.”58 The fair cross-section requirement does not require that juries
be “representative of society as a whole,”59 but only that juries be drawn
from sources that are representative of the community.
A. Challenges to Discrimination in Jury Selection
The Supreme Court began to address racial discrimination in jury
selection soon after the Civil War.60 Prior to the extension of the Sixth
Amendment to the states, defendants brought challenges to discriminatory
jury selection practices under the Equal Protection clause. In Strauder v.
West Virginia, the Supreme Court overturned the murder conviction of an
African-American man because the state’s exclusion of African-Americans
from jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause.61 In Norris v.
Alabama, the Court held that Jackson County denied an African-American
defendant equal protection of the law. In that case, even though African53. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
54. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states provide the right to a jury trial in
serious criminal cases).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
56. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 85–86.
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2012).
58. Id. § 1861.
59. See Erdrich, supra note 10.
60. Washburn, supra note 20, at 745.
61. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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American males were not expressly prohibited from serving on juries, no
African-American had ever served on a jury in Jackson County.62
The Court first applied the fair cross-section requirement to the states in
Taylor v. Louisiana, where it found a violation of the fair cross-section
requirement in a law that excluded women from jury service unless they
filed a written declaration asking to serve. In holding the law
unconstitutional, the Court said, “petit juries must be drawn from a source
fairly representative of the community.”63
A few years later, in Duren v. Missouri, the Court overturned a similar
law that granted exemptions from jury service to women who requested
them. This law resulted in a jury venire that consisted of only 14.5%
women in a county where women made up 54% of the general population.64
In finding the law unconstitutional, the Court stated, “any category [of
exemptions] expressly limited to a group in the community of sufficient
magnitude and distinctiveness . . . such as women . . . runs the danger of
resulting in underrepresentation sufficient to constitute a prima facie
violation of that constitutional requirement.”65
Duren was a landmark case because it provided the framework for all
future Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenges. In order to make a
showing of such a prima facie violation, the Duren Court held that a
defendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.66
Unfortunately, while it provides the necessary framework, Duren serves as
a poor model for other fair cross-section challenges. As Indians who have
brought fair-cross section challenges in federal courts have come to learn, it
is difficult to make a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 362–63 (1979).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 364.
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because “the underrepresentation [in Duren] was so extreme” that it “offers
little guidance for closer cases.”67
B. Fair Cross-section Challenges Brought by Indians in Federal Court
Although the subject of this paper is tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians, the fair cross-section challenges brought by Indians tried in federal
court are useful for understanding how courts have applied Duren. As
discussed earlier, Indians who are charged with committing major crimes in
Indian country are tried in federal court. As one scholar has noted:
[T]he venire from which the jury is selected is unlikely to have a
single member of the Indian community in which the crime
occurred. At trial, neither the prosecutor, the defense attorney,
the marshals, nor the court security officers, the court reporter,
the judge, or law clerks are likely to live within the community
where the offense occurred. In many cases, the only other tribal
member in the courtroom will be the interpreter, if one is needed,
and the witnesses. In that sense, the tribunal may seem alien to
the defendant, and he may not feel that he is being judged in any
sense by his own community.68
These issues may also be present for non-Indians facing trial in tribal
courts; however, these concerns have not persuaded judges that Indians
tried in federal court receive unfair trials. So far, no Sixth Amendment fair
cross-section challenge brought by an Indian defendant has been
successful.69
Of course, non-Indians who bring fair cross-section challenges may
achieve different results. One major difference between these two situations
is that Indians are citizens of the United States. This is still true even when
they live in a quasi-sovereign territory. As citizens, they can vote in
elections and otherwise participate in the governance of the United States.
Non-Indians, by definition, are not members of a tribe. Although they may
live or work in Indian country, non-Indians may not be involved with the
governance of Indian country.

67. Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 598 (1990).
68. Washburn, supra note 20, at 723–24.
69. Id. at 755 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit joins the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in never having
entertained a successful challenge by an Indian to an Indian country prosecution for lack of a
jury constituting a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community.”).
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However, it is also true that Indians tried in federal court are often tried a
long distance away from the communities where their crimes were
allegedly committed.70 Non-Indians tried in tribal courts will be presumably
tried in the locality or vicinity of the crime they allegedly committed.
Because non-Indians must have some relationship to Indian Country before
jurisdiction can be imposed, non-Indians who are tried in tribal courts may
have some familiarity with the tribe and the culture due to their relationship
with a member of the tribe or the fact that they lived or worked in Indian
country. Despite these differences, the cases challenging the lack of Indians
in federal court jury venires may be predictive of the outcomes in cases
challenging tribal court jurisdiction under the VAWA.
The first requirement under Duren is to show that there is a distinctive
group in the community that is being underrepresented in, or excluded
from, jury selection.71 The Supreme Court did not describe what makes a
group distinctive in Duren. In fact, the Court’s sole statement about what
constitutes a distinct group was that women “are sufficiently numerous and
distinct from men.”72 The “sufficiently numerous” statement suggests that a
group has to constitute a large part of the community, but it is not clear that
size must be a factor.
Courts have spent little time discussing whether Indians are considered a
distinctive group in the community. There are two reasons for the dearth of
analysis on this point. Either the government will not dispute that Indians
are a distinctive group, or a court will assume without discussion that
Indians are a distinctive group.73 The size of the Indian population in a
particular community has not factored in the analysis of this prong of the
test, but that could be because fair cross-section challenges brought by
Indians are often brought in states with large Indian populations (relative to
other states).
The second prong of the Duren test requires underrepresentation of a
distinctive group that is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community.74 Courts use an absolute disparity
calculation to determine whether the representation of a group in the jury
70. See Washburn, supra note 20, at 711–12.
71. Duren, 439 U.S. at 363.
72. Id. at 364.
73. See United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The government
does not dispute that Native Americans are a distinctive group in North Dakota.”); United
States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1981) (“There is no question that Indians
constitute a distinctive group in the community . . . .”).
74. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
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venire is fair and reasonable.75 Absolute disparity is “the percentage of
[people within the group] on the list of persons eligible for petit jury
service . . . subtracted from the percentage of [people within the group] in
the general population . . . .”76 In United States v. Clifford, the Eighth
Circuit found that the “8.4% Indian representation on petit juries [was] fair
and reasonable when related to their 15.6% proportion of the total
population . . . .”77 The court calculated these numbers to show “7.2%
underrepresentation (15.6% - 8.4% = 7.2%)” of Indians in the petit jury.78
Since the Supreme Court has held that underrepresentation of as much as
10% does not equal substantial underrepresentation, the defendant could not
establish a prima facie case of unfair representation.79 The court dismissed
the argument that it would be extremely difficult to show a disparity greater
than 10% where Indians only make up 15% of the population.80
Under Duren, successful challenges to jury makeup have involved much
higher disparities. For example, Duren involved a 40% actual disparity, and
Castaneda v. Partida, an equal protection case challenging the make-up of
a grand jury, involved a 39.5% actual disparity.81 Both Duren and
Castaneda involved underrepresentation of groups that were the majority in
their communities.82 Women made up slightly over 50% of the population
in the county in Duren, and Mexican-Americans made up over 70% of the
population in the county in Castaneda.83 Because these cases involved the
underrepresentation of majority groups, these cases fail to aid in
determining what type of disparity is “fair and reasonable” for minority
groups.
The third requirement of the Duren test is that the group’s
underrepresentation must be due to systematic exclusion.84 Many fair crosssection lawsuits brought by Indians address the use of county voter rolls as
a source for jury members.85 Indians tend to be less likely to register to vote
because, in general, they may be more invested in tribal government than
75. See United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965)).
80. Id. at 155–56.
81. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365–66 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 487 (1977).
82. Duren, 439 U.S. at 365–66; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 487.
83. Duren, 439 U.S. at 359; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 486.
84. 439 U.S. at 364.
85. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2003).
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the state or federal government,86 and because they face higher poverty
rates, which makes them more likely to have moved since registering.87
Courts, however, have not found that relying on voter rolls amounts to a
systematic exclusion. In United States v. Morin, the Eighth Circuit said:
“[a]bsent proof that Native Americans, in particular, face obstacles to voter
registration in presidential elections, ‘[e]thnic and racial disparities between
the general population and jury pools do not by themselves invalidate the
use of voter registration lists and cannot establish the systematic exclusion
of allegedly under-represented groups.’”88 Other courts have also upheld
the use of voter rolls as lawful under the JSSA.89
In United States v. Etsitty, an Indian defendant on trial for murder
alleged that the trial court’s systematic transfer of cases from the Prescott
Division (an area with a large Indian population) to the Phoenix Division
(an area with a smaller Indian population) violated his right to an impartial
jury.90 The Ninth Circuit found nothing wrong with the trial court’s
decision to transfer cases from Prescott to Phoenix in this instance, but
warned that the case for finding a Duren prima facie case would be stronger
if there had been proof of a systematic transfer of cases.91 The court found a
written policy stating that “‘all civil and criminal cases founded upon
causes of action in the Phoenix and Prescott Division shall be tried in
Phoenix’” was concerning, but, decided that the rule was not an issue in this
case because the presiding judge had transferred the trial for other
reasons.92 These cases show that defendants bringing fair cross-section
challenges face a heavy burden. The fact that a particular defendant faced a
jury venire or petit jury without Indians is not in itself a violation.
III. Tribal Courts and Non-Indians
The fact that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians is
problematic because non-Indians make up a majority of the population in
Indian country. About 4.6 million people live in Indian country.93 Only 1.1
86. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981).
87. Washburn, supra note 20, at 748.
88. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 1998)).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983).
90. United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended on
denial of reh'g, 140 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 1998).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 426.
93. NORRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 13.
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million of them, or 23%, identify as Indian.94 While Indian country is
overall populated by more non-Indians than Indians, the particular
demographics vary by reservation. For example, the two largest
reservations by population are the Navajo Nation in Arizona, New Mexico,
and Utah, and the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma.95 Over 97% of those
living in Navajo Nation identify as Indian or part Indian.96 In contrast, only
20% of those on the Osage Reservation identify as Indian or part Indian.97
Some Indian reservations remarkably contain only a few dozen Indians. For
example, in Oliphant, the Port Madison Reservation, the home of the
Suquamish Indian Tribe, “‘contained over 2900 non-Indians and only fifty
[tribal] members.’”98
A. A Brief History of Indian Country and Tribal Courts
The demographics of Indian country can be readily explained by history.
The General Allotment Act of 1887 divided reservations up into allotments
for tribal members with left over land to be used by non-Indian
homesteaders.99 The goal of the program was to force Indians to assimilate
into American society. Congress thought that “[r]eservations would
disappear over time, and the ‘Indian problem’ would be solved.”100 That
never happened. Instead, allotment led to reservations with large non-Indian
populations.101 “Years later, after the allotment process was abandoned,
Congress ‘uncoupled reservation status from Indian ownership’ by defining
‘Indian country’ to encompass all reservation lands, including that owned
by non-Indians.”102 It was also during allotment that many Indians became
citizens of the United States.103 Congress finally declared that all Indians
were citizens in 1924.104
Although run by tribal governments, the justice system that non-Indians
face under the VAWA will not be wholly unfamiliar because tribal courts
are highly regulated by Congress and many tribal courts are modeled after
94. Id.
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1999).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).
104. Id.
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the American judicial system.105 The background of Ex Parte Crow Dog
illustrates how tribal court systems developed. The case arose after a
member of the Lakota Indian Tribe murdered another Lakota on the Lakota
Reservation in South Dakota.106 A federal territorial court, unhappy with
the tribe’s method of solving the dispute, brought criminal charges against
the defendant, Crow Dog, but the Supreme Court overturned the conviction
because the federal territorial court lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant.107 Following this decision, Congress enacted the Major Crimes
Act, which gave the federal government jurisdiction over “major crimes”
that occurred in Indian country.108 To deal with minor crimes, the
Department of the Interior set up Courts of Indian Offenses.109
The federal government continued to have a role in tribal courts long
after it helped establish them. In 1968, Congress passed the ICRA. As the
Supreme Court noted, “a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of
Title I was to ‘secure for the American Indian the broad constitutional
rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect individual
Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.’”110 The
ICRA guarantees Indians tried in tribal courts enjoy the same constitutional
protections guaranteed under the Constitution, with a few exceptions.111
The ICRA also places limits on the penalties that tribal courts can impose.
Generally, tribal courts cannot sentence defendants to more than one year of
incarceration and a five thousand dollar fine for any one offense, unless the
person has been previously convicted for the same or similar offense by the
United States.112 In cases where the person has been previously convicted,
tribal courts cannot sentence defendants to incarceration for more than three
years, or impose more than fifteen thousand dollars in fines.113 As already
discussed, the ICRA also requires that defendants have a right to a trial by

105. See B.J. Jones, Chief Judge, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Court, Role of Indian
Tribal Courts in the Justice System (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.icctc.org/Tribal
%20Courts.pdf (unpublished manuscript).
106. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
107. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 105.
108. Jones, supra note 105, at 4 n.9.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90841, at 5–6 (1967)).
111. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
112. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
113. Id.
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jury, but it only requires a jury of six people and does not require an
impartial jury.114
B. Tribal Courts and Non-Indian Jurors
While the Supreme Court noted in Oliphant that the Suquamish Indian
Tribe did not allow non-Indians to serve on juries,115 many Indian tribes do
not have such restrictions. The Navajo Nation not only allows non-Indians
to serve on its juries, it even has a procedure in place to ensure than nonIndians are called to serve.116 Similar to federal courts, the Navajo Nation
uses its own voter rolls to draw jurors.117 To ensure that non-Indians are
represented, the tribal court clerk “also select[s] a series of names that [do]
not appear to be Navajo from the county voter registration rolls.”118 The
Navajo Nation has this system in place even though it is not required by the
ICRA.119
The Navajo Nation is not the only tribe that actively tries to recruit nonIndians to serve on juries. The Tulalip Tribes, a union of several tribes in
the Puget Sound region, draw their potential jurors from enrollment and
employment records. In order to qualify for service, jurors must either be a
“Tulalip Tribal member living on or near the Tulalip Indian Reservation, a
resident of the Tulalip Indian Reservation, or an employee of the Tulalip
Tribes or any of its entities, agencies, or subdivisions for at least one
continuous year.”120 Although not explicit, this policy presumably allows
non-Indians to serve on juries.
Not all tribal courts, however, currently allow non-Indians to serve on
juries. The Osage Tribe in Oklahoma, which has one of the largest
reservations by population, does not currently allow non-Indians to serve on
juries.121 Similarly, the Oglala Sioux Tribe in North Dakota draws potential

114. Id.
115. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978).
116. Washburn, supra note 20, at 761.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (containing no requirement that tribal court juries call
non-Indians for service); NORRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 14 (showing that the Navajo
Nation has a total population of 173,667 and that 169,213 of that population identifies as
American Indian “alone or in combination”).
120. A Juror’s Guide to Tulalip Tribal Court, TULALIP TRIBES, http://www.tulaliptribesnsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/JuryInformation.aspx (last visited Apr.
3, 2013).
121. Bill No. ONCA 11-41, Osage Nation Congress, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 6, 2011).
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jurors only from the tribe’s pool of membership.122 While it does not
expressly prohibit non-Indians from serving on juries, by drawing jurors
from membership pools, it effectively prohibits non-Indians from serving.
Although some tribes prohibit non-Indians from serving on juries, the
language of the VAWA clearly requires that non-Indians be allowed to
serve on tribal courts juries (for the VAWA’s jurisdictional provision to
take effect), as long as non-Indians comprise a distinctive group.123
C. A Hypothetical Duren Challenge
Although in most cases non-Indians will have access to juries made up of
both Indians and non-Indians, there may be cases where an all-Indian jury
tries and convicts a non-Indian defendant, even when non-Indians are not
prohibited from serving on juries. It is important to determine how a court
might evaluate such a case. Although the Sixth Amendment does not apply
to tribal court proceedings,124 the text of the VAWA is modeled after the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement and the JSSA,125 so a court
will likely use Sixth Amendment fair cross-section cases as a guide to
interpret the statute.
Similar to the first Duren requirement,126 the VAWA states that jurors
must be drawn from sources that “do not systematically exclude any
distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians,” but it does not
define distinctive group in further detail.127 There are two possible
interpretations of this language. First, Congress could have meant that nonIndians will always be a distinctive group, and that they can never be
systematically excluded. Second, Congress might expect that federal courts
would look to case law to define the term “distinctive.” Federal courts
generally take it for granted that Indians are a distinctive group in the
community, which may be the approach that federal courts take with nonIndians. Even if a federal court reads the statute to mean that non-Indians
must be present in significant numbers in order to be considered a
122. Oglala Sioux Tribe: Law and Order Code – Chapter 14: Rules of Court, NAT’L
INDIAN L. LIBR., http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/oglala_sioux/chapter14-rulesofcourt.htm (last
visited Apr. 3, 2013).
123. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(d)(3)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122.
124. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
125. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not
apply to tribal courts because they were not created pursuant to the Constitution).
126. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
127. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(d)(3)(B), 127 Stat. at 122.
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distinctive group, the demographics of Indian country would mean that they
are almost always a distinctive group. Even in Navajo Nation, where over
97% of the population is Indian, there are over four thousand non-Indian
residents.128 That could still be a significant number. Therefore, in most
cases this requirement should be fairly simple to satisfy.
The second Duren requirement, whether the disparity is fair and
reasonable, depends on the percentage of the total population of nonIndians eligible for jury service within the particular community. As the
Clifford case demonstrates, it is difficult for minority groups to show a
significant disparity.129 In the Navajo Nation, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for non-Indians to bring a successful challenge because they
make up less than 3% of the overall population.
Meeting this requirement might be easier on a reservation where nonIndians outnumber Indians, like the Port Madison Reservation. In 1978,
while the Suquamish tribe litigated Oliphant, Indians made up less than 2%
of the population of the Port Madison Reservation.130 An absolute disparity
of near 40% could be much easier to find in a community with similar
demographics. If non-Indians eligible to serve on a jury made up 98% of
the population on the reservation, but only 50% of those called to serve on
juries, there would be a 48% absolute disparity.
Most cases will probably fall somewhere in between these two examples.
Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly how this analysis will be
resolved without knowing the specific demographics of the tribe involved
and the percentage of non-Indians that will actually serve on a particular
jury. Nonetheless, where non-Indians are a substantial majority, meeting
this requirement could be fairly easy.
Finally, like Duren, the VAWA only prohibits systematic exclusions.131
In order to find systematic exclusion, there would have to be evidence that
the system of calling jurors to service effectively excludes all or most nonIndians.132 While federal courts have not found that using county voter rolls
in order to draw jurors in federal trials amounts to a systematic exclusion

128. NORRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 14.
129. See Part II.B.
130. Frickey, supra note 98, at 15.
131. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54.
132. See United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2003) (evaluating
whether an exclusion is systematic by looking at how the District of North Dakota calls
jurors for service).
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registering to vote,133 the same logic would not apply to tribal courts using
only tribal membership rolls because non-Indians are excluded from tribal
membership rolls. Therefore, in order to exercise jurisdiction, a tribal court
must use an alternative or additional source for selecting jurors.
Because the practices used by the Navajo Nation and the Tulalip Tribes
are designed to incorporate non-Indians, they are unlikely to amount to
systematic exclusions. However, because the Navajo system relies on a
tribal court clerk to select names from the county voter rolls that do not
appear to be Navajo,134 it may be susceptible to fraud and error. But, the
chance of fraud or error, without evidence of such, is likely not enough to
amount to a systematic exclusion.135
One issue that may lead to a systematic exclusion of non-Indians is a
tribal court’s inability to compel non-Indians into jury service. In state and
federal court systems, jurors are compelled to attend jury duty by law
unless they are able to receive an exemption.136 In Navajo Nation v.
MacDonald, the Navajo Supreme court recognized that tribal courts face
difficulties when it comes to getting non-Indians to serve as they “may not
feel compelled to appear when summoned for tribal jury duty.”137 Since
tribal courts only have jurisdiction over non-Indians in a limited set of
circumstances, non-Indians cannot be prosecuted or penalized for failing to
attend jury duty. Nothing in the VAWA gives tribal courts a method for
compelling non-jurors to attend.
B.J. Jones, the Chief Judge of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal
Court, suggests that the tribal courts’ inability to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians is one reason that (he believes) non-Indians
are (sometimes) excluded from serving on tribal court juries.138 “One
obvious problem tribes confront when deciding who should be allowed to
sit on tribal juries is that a non-Indian cannot be prosecuted by a tribe for
violating his sworn duties as a juror and this may convince tribes not to
allow them to sit.”139 The inability to compel non-Indians to serve on tribal
133. Id.
134. Washburn, supra note 20, at 761.
135. See United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 426 (9th Cir. 1997).
136. For an example of such a law, see 38 OKLA. STAT. § 28 (2011) (“It is the policy of
this state that all citizens qualified for jury service pursuant to this section have an obligation
to serve on petit juries when summoned by the courts of this state, unless excused.”).
137. Washburn, supra note 20, at 761.
138. Jones, supra note 105, at 10. Of course, as already noted, not all tribes exclude nonIndians from serving on juries.
139. Id.
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court juries may amount to a systematic exclusion. Even so, the reasoning
used by courts suggests that this will not amount to a systematic exclusion.
The Ninth Circuit has said that absent evidence that Indians “face obstacles
to voter registration in presidential elections,” the use of voter rolls did not
amount to a systematic exclusion, because Indians could register to vote.140
The same logic may be used here. Because nothing prevents non-Indians
from attending jury service when they are summoned, a court may find that
there is no systematic exclusion.
Accordingly, it will be extremely difficult for non-Indians to prevail in a
Duren challenge over tribal court jurisdiction. Although a successful
challenge is unlikely, and therefore juries may be legally “fair,”
determining actual fairness is much more difficult.
IV. Race, Jury Selection, and Fairness
The assumption underlying the concern over the VAWA’s expansion of
tribal court jurisdiction is that Indians will usually side with other Indians,
and will convict non-Indians even when there is less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. There is, however, evidence that this level of bias will not
occur. First, tribal leaders have been working to regain jurisdiction over
non-Indians since Oliphant was decided in 1978. As noted by Louise
Erdrich, an advocate of the VAWA, “[t]ribal judges know they must make
impeccable decisions. They know that they are being watched closely and
must defend their hard-won jurisdiction. Our courts and lawyers cherish
every tool given by Congress. Nobody wants to blow it by convicting a
non-Indian without overwhelming, unshakable evidence.”141 Thus, because
Congress can divest tribes of jurisdiction over non-Indians through future
legislation, tribal leaders may have reason to be especially protective of the
rights of non-Indians.
Another reason to doubt that non-Indians will inevitably face bias is that
tribal courts have not proven to be biased against non-Indians in civil cases.
One scholar studied Navajo appellate decisions as a way to assess the
fairness of the Navajo judicial system towards non-Indians.142 She found
ninety-five civil cases covering a variety of legal areas where Navajo and
non-Navajo parties (oftentimes non-Indian companies) were on opposite

140. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2003).
141. Erdrich, supra note 10.
142. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005).
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sides of litigation.143 The non-Navajo party won 47.4% and lost 52.6% of
these cases.144 The win-loss balance was consistent across all types of
disputes, even child custody disputes.145 This win-loss ratio suggests that
non-Navajo and Navajo litigants are equally able to predict their chances at
success in litigation.146
One context where tribal courts might be especially prone to bias against
non-Indians is in child placement and adoption proceedings under the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Navajo Nation has declared that its
children are its most precious resource, so it would be unsurprising “if this
concern resulted in bias against non-Navajo parents. . . .”147 However, “not
one of the 534 Navajo appellate cases online arises under ICWA.”148 Of the
custody decisions not implicating ICWA, only six were between Navajo
and non-Navajo parents, and the non-Navajo parent won four times.149 Of
course, with such limited data and small sample sizes it is not possible to
draw any definitive conclusions.
Even if this data suggests that Navajo Nation court proceedings are fair
to non-Indians, the win-loss ratio of Navajo Nation appellate court
decisions cannot be used to suggest that all tribal courts and juries will be
fair towards non-Indians. First, the Navajo Nation allows non-Indians on
juries, so it would be unfair to say that this is representative of what juries
composed entirely of Indians would do (although simply because the
Navajo Nation allows non-Indians on jurors does not mean that non-Indians
are actually present on every jury). Second, the Navajo Nation is the largest
reservation in the country, so it may be that its judical system is more
sophisticated and well funded than others. Despite the limitations of this
data, it shows that tribal courts can be fair towards non-Indians and that a
litigant’s (or defendant’s) status as a non-Indian does not necessarily
determine the outcome of any particular case.
The assumption that Indians will be biased against non-Indians is
primarily an argument about race. Racial discrimination and jury selection
have a long, fraught history together. In most cases, non-Indians will be
represented on tribal court juries, but it is important to analyze why an all143. Id. at 1075.
144. Id. at 1047.
145. Id. at 1051.
146. Berger goes into a much deeper discussion about what the nearly 50-50 win-loss
rate suggests. See id. at 1074–79.
147. Id. at 1088.
148. Id. at 1090.
149. Id.
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Indian jury would be so objectionable. There are some who take offense at
the suggestion that a jury composed entirely of Indians would be biased
against non-Indians.150 But, the type of criminal jurisdiction the VAWA
permits is important. These are crimes of sexual assault and rape committed
by non-Indian males against Indian females. How would one perceive the
fairness of a trial for African-American male accused of raping a white
female? What if all of the jurors were white?
In McCleskey v. Kemp, McCleskey, an African-American male, was
sentenced to death for killing a white police officer during the course of an
armed robbery.151 McCleskey challenged his sentence under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and argued that his sentence was influenced by
his race.152 He cited a study showing that persons who murder white people
are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who murder black
people and that black murderers are more likely to receive the death penalty
than white murderers.153 Although McCleskey ultimately lost, it was not
because the study he cited was invalid or inaccurate, but because he could
not prove that the decision-makers in his particular case acted with a
discriminatory purpose.154 This study speaks to a larger issue behind this
controversy—we do not trust jurors to make decisions without considering
race. Even if we trust that most individuals will not make decisions based
on racial prejudice, we suspect that, in general, race may play some role in
a jury’s decision and taint the verdict. Jurors may not go into a jury room
and decide that a defendant deserves a death sentence solely based on the
defendant’s race, but it is hard to imagine that race plays no role.155
150. See Erdrich, supra note 10 (stating the idea that “Native people can’t be impartial
jurists” is a “fulsome notion”).
151. 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
152. Id. at 286.
153. Id. at 291; see also David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
154. Id. at 292–93.
155. This discussion of racial discrimination and juries is woefully incomplete. Racial
discrimination is not just an issue when it comes to jury venire and petit juries. Racial
discrimination is also prevalent in striking jurors. For an overview of this issue, see WAYNE
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1068–98 (5th ed. 2009) (chapter 22, “Trial by Jury
and Impartial Judge”). In the area of peremptory challenges, there is a lot of interesting
scholarship on the relationship between race and jury selection. The seminal case on this
issue is Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Justice Rehnquist authored a particularly
interesting dissent in that case. He wrote:
In my view, there is simply nothing “unequal” about the state using its
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury involving black
defendants, so long as such challenges are used to exclude whites in cases
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The interesting aspect of the controversy surrounding tribal court
jurisdiction under the VAWA is that the tables are turned. This time the
ones claiming unfair treatment are not members of a racial minority, but of
the racial majority. Non-Indians can receive fair trials in tribal courts, but a
more accurate statement might be that non-Indians will receive trials that
are just as fair, if not more so, as the trials that racial minorities receive in
the American judicial system. If there are in fact cases where non-Indians
are treated unfairly, and there may be some, it would only be fair to
evaluate whether our judicial system as a whole grants enough protections
to racial and ethnic minorities charged with crimes. The protections granted
to non-Indian criminal defendants in tribal court are similar enough to the
protections granted to criminal defendants tried in state and federal courts.
If there is a problem with one, then there is a problem with all.
Impartiality can be a legitimate concern with tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians, but it does not mean that such jurisdiction should not
exist. There is a great need for justice in Indian country and tribal court
jurisdiction over domestic violence crimes is an appropriate solution, even
if it may be imperfect. The threat of this jurisdiction alone may also be
enough to deter future sexual assaults—at least at the high level they are
being committed now.
Conclusion
How protections for minority groups may be strengthened is a subject for
another note. This note does not try to offer a policy solution for this
problem. Instead, the goal of this note is to highlight the parallel between
the alarm over tribal court jurisdiction in the VAWA with concerns that
critical race scholars have been raising for decades about how race
permeates our justice system.
The VAWA’s expansion of tribal court jurisdiction provides tribal courts
with a means to address the high levels of sexual violence committed in
Indian country. While concerns about tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians are not unfounded, it is important to consider that this jurisdiction is

involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants,
Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 137. The implication of this statement seems to be that juries should not
be composed of people of the same race as the defendant in order to eliminate racial bias in
favor of the defendant by members of his own minority group. For scholarship on Batson,
race, and jury selection, see Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and
Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511.
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needed in order to enforce sexual violence laws that otherwise go
unenforced.
The text of the VAWA amends the ICRA to provide jurisdiction over
non-Indians in a limited set of cases. Jurisdiction can only be asserted when
the defendant has an existing relationship to the Indian victim or to the
tribe. The VAWA adequately addresses gaps that previously existed in the
ICRA by requiring that tribal courts draw jurors from sources that reflect a
fair cross-section of the community. Because non-Indians make up a
substantial portion of Indian country, they will be represented on tribal
court juries. While this note has suggested that non-Indians will receive fair
trials in tribal courts, the debate over this issue is part of a larger debate
about the role of race in jury selections. It may be that there is no way to
make our jury system more representative than it currently is, or it may be
that Duren inadequately protects defendants who are part of the minority in
a given community and this system needs remedying. However, if members
of Congress are concerned that the VAWA does not adequately protect the
rights of non-Indians, then Congress should try to strengthen the protections
for all minorities who face non-representative juries.
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